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Abstract: Maritime ports are intensive energy areas with a plenty of electrical systems that require an average power of 
many tens of megawatts (MW). Competitiveness, profits, reduction of pollution, reliability of operations, carbon emission 
trading are important energy related considerations for any port authority. Current technology allows the deployment of a local 
micro-grid of the size of tenths of MW, capable of islanded operation in case of emergency and to grant an increasing energy 
independency. Ownership of the grid permits a large flexibility on prices of energy sold inside the port, trading on local electric 
market and reduction of pollution. Renewable energy generation has a large impact on costs since features a low marginal cost. 
Unfortunately the smart grid is a critical asset within the port infrastructure and its intelligence is a high-level target for cyber-
attacks. Such attacks are often based on malicious software (malware), which makes use of a controlling entity on the network 
to coordinate and propagate. In this document, we will outline some features of a port smart grid and typical characteristics of 
cyber-attacks including potential ways to recognize it and suggestion for effective countermeasures. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is twofold; on one side it 
highlights advantages of upgrading or deploying a smart 
micro smart grid in a port and on the other side the 
importance of a proper extension of cybersecurity concepts to 
the operation of the port smart micro grid. Being smart 
micro-grids heavily dependent on a distributed intelligence, 
they are exposes to a number of possible targeted attacks. 
Port operators, ships, and port infrastructure target of an 
attack may be the vehicle to propagate these attacks to other 
organizations. Furthermore extensive communication 
capabilities may increase vulnerabilities. 
Energy in a port is distributed through a local electrical 
grid connected to an external utility via a point of connection 
and often to internal more and more renewable generation. 
Upgrading to a smart microgrid instead of using a dumb 
micro-grid offers advantages in terms flexibility of 
utilization, dependability, possible revenues coming from 
services paid from its internal users, savings deriving from 
better contracts that can be stipulated with the utility, returns 
from trading of services. 
A smart micro-grid is commanded and controlled by a 
relatively small SCADA and DMS (Distribution 
Management System). This small SCADA plays a very 
critical role in operations of the smart microgrid and due to 
its pervasiveness, richness in communications, smartness 
available at all levels, connection to non-secure subsystems 
and organizations is vulnerable to attacks. 
A smart microgrid properly sized, configured and used 
means efficient and cost effective internal generation and 
utilization of energy, i.e. important issues for port authorities 
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and port operators due to impacts on operational cost, 
business continuity, compliance to emission regulations, 
satisfaction for operators and in last instance its 
competiveness [1]. 
Distributed intelligence, adaptive protection and control, 
strong user involvement, load and generation 
programmability and effective management of electric fleets 
are sources of effective benefits to stakeholders and users [2]. 
The resiliency of the microgrid is of utmost importance 
due to the reliance of port infrastructure on continuity and 
quality of its operations. Resiliency “is the ability to bounce 
back, to mitigate the effects of an attack, or recover quickly 
after getting a hit” [3]. 
The cyber security issues of smart grid infrastructures have 
been addressed by several research papers in order to 
improve the cyber security of the smart grid by using 
different methodologies and techniques. 
Rawat et al. [4] they explored the challenges for the smart 
grid security, classifying the attacks based on the type of 
network: home network (HAN), neighborhood area network 
(NAN) and wide area network (WAN). Starting from the fact 
that information security is based on three known principles 
such as confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) have 
shown the impacts deriving from attacks on information 
security. 
Shapsough et al. [5] presenting some security challenges in 
the smart grid system and possible solutions, recommends a 
new security conceptual model based on the Internet of 
Things paradigm. Development of standards, conceptual 
models is crucial to increase a secure design of a micro smart 
grid. 
Another study, conducted by Liu et al. [6] pointed out the 
importance of the identification of the relevant IT security 
and privacy problems in order to create a reliable intelligent 
grid. With reference to IT security problems, especially in 
relation to privacy problems, the differences between IT 
networks and networks of networks were highlighted. 
intelligent. 
Wang et al. [7] have developed a study on IT security on 
surveys and challenges in the smart grid, which shows that 
due to the complexity of the network architecture, the delay 
limits on different time scales, the scalability and the 
diversified capacity of the built-in devices, the most viable 
solutions are those on a large scale shaped on the needs for 
different network applications. 
Bedi et al. [8] with a Review of internet of things (IoT) in 
electric power and energy systems, have analyzed the use of 
IoT technologies in electricity and energy systems. It 
highlights how the effective use of IoT technologies can 
represent an opportunity for a rapid development in smart 
grid applications but with some challenges represented by 
aspects related to communication Digitization brings 
significant benefits but a safe use of IoT technologies in 
smart grid applications is necessary. 
Kimany et al. [9] analyze Cyber-security issues capturing 
the development of IoT-based smart grid, highlighting how 
the use of IoT-based technologies in smart grid applications 
represents one of the biggest challenges in terms of IT 
security, in the development of this system. 
Eder et al. [10] in order to predict future types of malware, 
it develops a cyber attack model for detecting malware-based 
communications derived from existing technologies. 
With reference to electrical networks, given that existing 
malware attacks can have significantly destructive impacts, it 
is important to provide adequate description of the generic 
phases of cyber attacks carried out by means of malware. 
Thanks to the generic life cycle model that formalizes the 
phases of malware-based cyber attacks, you can be able to 
analyze existing malware by fragmenting it into recurring 
cycles, thus allowing a detailed comparison of the 
characteristics of existing malware and constituting a 
finalized basis to predict future developments. 
Therefore the impact of cyber-attacks on power systems 
has been a primary issue of research in recent years [11]. 
Smart grids depend significantly on data transfers, with 
higher quality of service (QoS),]. Due to their highly 
integrated nature, smart grids are also more vulnerable to 
cyber threats and attacks. 
Most of the existing research has explored either cyber 
system or power system vulnerabilities, but not both in a 
comprehensive and truly integrated manner. Sridhar et al [12] 
presented the impact of data integrity attacks on voltage 
control loop. The impact of cyber-attacks on transient 
stability of smart grids with voltage support devices is 
analyzed by Chen et al. [13]. A framework that models a 
class of cyber-physical switching vulnerabilities in smart grid 
systems is found in Liu et al. [14]. 
2. Port Organization 
Two key figures are present in a port: the port authority 
and port operators. Operators are entity/organization working 
in a port that use and/or generate energy, own infrastructures, 
plants and buildings and provide services to their customers. 
The port authority, within its institutional role, can decide to 
operate as an energy aggregator of internal energy resources, 
establishing a virtual power plant, scheduling operations 
according to optimality criteria agreed with operators and 
stakeholders. As an aggregator it can trade energy and 
capacity services and respond to signals (generally prices) 
coming from the external utility. 
Of course port operators and port authorities look for 
profits [15] and competitiveness, from different point of 
view. Most of them have a growing focus on reduction of 
emissions, energy efficiency and energy saving, 
According to Theodoropoulos [16], Energy efficiency and 
reduction of emissions is achieved by: 
a. Effective use of energy mix of internal traditional and 
renewables generation. 
b. Adjusting demand and generation of energy by flexible 
management, instantaneous load shedding or 
curtailment and intelligent utilization of battery storage. 
c. Maximum priority given to renewable energy as 
primary resource. 
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d. Constantly moving generation and utilization of 
equipment to the their respective high efficient 
operating points. 
e. Having operators with greater awareness on micro-grid 
status and current/forecasted prices in order to permit to 
them the correct planning of their own technical and 
economic operations. 
f. Maximize the use of electric transportation within the 
port area. 
3. Smart Micro Grid and Vulnerability 
A smart micro-grids is characterized by a set of distinctive 
aspects (small geographical distribution, distributed presence 
of intelligence, smart sub-systems, extensive interaction 
between logical and physical level, strong requirements on 
service continuity, resilience, extensive use of INTERNET 
communication services [17], access by many users and 
organization) that make traditional mechanism for ICT 
defense techniques weaker or some time ineffective. 
The weakness towards potential cyber-attacks increases in 
proportion to the growth of the complexity of microgrid 
control [18, 19] is amplified by: 
a. Increasing interconnections with public networks, end 
users and IT organizations. 
b. Extensive use of INTERNET based communication 
among all customers of the microgrid. 
c. Increasing adoption of COTS (Commercial Off-the-
Shelf products in control) such as operating systems, 
DBMS, application software, etc. 
d. Introduction of new technological paradigms of the ICT 
sector (e.g. virtualized systems, clouds). 
e. Big growth of data volume coming from non-
homogeneous and non-secure sources. 
f. Smart metering (Automatic metering infrastructure). 
g. Technological evolution that is introducing new security 
related vulnerabilities and criticalities. 
Security context finds an additional interpretation in the 
analysis of the level of danger of potential attackers and their 
motivations, objectives and technical capabilities. 
Preventing malicious events arising from well-organized 
attackers with strong financial resources, technical skills and 
the availability of state-of-the-art technological tools is a 
critical issue in a port and maritime organization. 
Operators and stakeholders need to identify their specific 
threats and estimate their risks, to protect their business 
assets, minimize costs in case of failures and recover as 
quickly as possible. Taking into account that the 
infrastructure of the electrical micro-grid generates a high 
dependence of almost all the infrastructures and vital 
functions of the port on it, it is evident the disastrous impact 
that might have for a port a cyber-attack aimed at forcing 
these infrastructures out of service. 
Beyond traditional attacks and exploitation of "zero-day" 
vulnerabilities that bypass signature-based attack detection 
systems, an attacker could design malicious activities based 
on the contemporary perturbation of information coming 
from the SCADA and physical equipment, what would 
trigger of actions that could cause unexpected behavior of the 
micro-grid. 
This situation greatly complicates the micro-grid security 
monitoring practices and the degree of applicability of the 
technologies available today in ICT field. 
The combination of relevant factors, such as the logical-
physical nature of the infrastructure, the need to guarantee a 
high level of continuity of service and the threat of 
technically competent and well-organized attackers, makes 
apparent the need of sophisticated counter-measures for 
attack prevention, identification and quick response. 
Operations such as: 
a. acquisition of feedback regarding the level of security 
of the physical infrastructure. 
b. correlation of information coming from the ICT 
security domain, physical security and SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition). 
c. minimization of reaction and recovery times are very 
critical in relation to security. 
Analysis and design support in relation to vulnerability is 
based on cyber security testbed platforms. It permits to 
investigate security issues and countermeasures. Different 
network attack scenarios can be simulated. Most of the 
testbeds consider security and privacy as a priority [20]. 
Typical attack scenarios [21] are: 
a. Unauthorized access to a PLC, RTU, PMU, IED device; 
b. Blocking field sensors from reporting false data or 
events; 
c. Spoofing; 
d. Message relay; 
e. Request tampering; 
f. Injection of malicious function; 
g. Denial of service (DoS) attack. 
It is a good practice to have all micro-grid customers and 
micro-grid owners equipped with their own cyber protections 
at hardware and software level including communication and 
training of operators or concerned people (awareness). 
According to Larkin M [22], game theory is a good reply 
to issues posed by cyber security; in particular three points 
are to be examined: 
Point 1. 
Methods to evaluate resiliency of a cyber system 
employing game theory and stochastic modeling. 
Point 2. 
Given the current state the grid and potential actions of an 
attacker, how is it possible to evaluate the likelihood of 
success or failure of defensive countermeasures? 
Point 3. 
Validate methods to perform a cost analysis to decide 
about upgrade or replacement of cyber defense hardware and 
software taking into account the effects on the system. 
4. Why a Smart Micro-grid 
A micro-grid is not a new concept since many large 
industrial areas and many ports are using an internal electrical 
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grid connected to an external utility and partially powered by 
internal generation. The micro-smart grid add pervasive 
intelligence, smart devices and an ubiquitous communication 
system [23] to an otherwise traditional micro-grid. 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defines a micro 
grid as: “A group of interconnected loads and distributed 
energy resources with clearly defined electrical boundaries 
that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the 
grid and can connect to and disconnect from the grid to 
enable it to operate in both grid-connected or island-mode 
[24]. 
As indicated in the White paper developed by Muni-Fed – 
Antea Group Energy Partners, LLC [25], smart micro-grids 
are also designed to allow delivering of excess energy into 
the incumbent utility grid as well as to import energy from 
the utility grid. A smart micro-grid is a small-scale version of 
the traditional utility grid designed to optimize energy 
services through its extensive use of decentralized flexible, 
user oriented control. 
Irrespective of the level of its smartness, a micro-grid 
consists of two major parts: 
a. The electrical infrastructure, i.e. the smart assets that 
generate, deliver, transform and use energy. 
b. Communication and control systems, i.e., bidirectional 
communication and control system that operates the 
whole electrical smart micro-grid. 
The most of ports are still using “dumb” micro-grids 
operating at significant marginal cost, rigidity of operations 
and a level of reliability and resiliency that would be helpful 
to be improved. 
A traditional dumb micro-grid shows a number of 
shortcomings, like: 
a. Difficulty to fully exploit the potential of internal 
generation resources, often random and not 
dispatchable (frequently renewables such that large 
arrays of PV modules, biogas fired turbines, wind 
turbines, storage batteries, etc.) and transform them into 
an opportunity by remunerate stakeholders without 
tantalizing micro-grid performance and violating 
contractual terms with any part connected to the 
microgrid; 
b. Difficulty to meet price expectations from operators by 
establishing a customizable and flexible tariff policy 
that fits well with their operational needs. And; 
c. Limited possibility to provide support to requests 
coming from external supplier and achieve revenues by 
contractualizing this support; 
d. Inadequate capability to trade services, actuate policies 
such as “Demand Response” (DR) and exploit “Time of 
Usage Tariff” (TOU); 
e. Less reliability and resilience compared to a smart 
micro-grid. 
A smart micro-grid is able to work out these shortcomings 
[26] and therefore is a sensible solution to help a port to 
increase its operational capabilities, its efficiency and 
eventually competitiveness. 
Revenues and savings generated by a smart micro grid 
compensate some or all of the capital and operating costs 
incurred by port authority to upgrade to a smart micro-grid 
and to operate it. 
5. Enabling Objectives 
Economic and technical objectives are enabling factors 
that justify deployment of a smart micro-grid. 
a. Economic objectives include cost reductions and 
streaming revenues coming from grid mode of 
operations like arbitrage/trading, reduction of cost of 
procurement of energy by virtue of flexible 
procurement (for base and time varying supply) 
contracts that may be stipulated, minimization of risks 
to incur into penalties due to non-compliance with 
contractual terms (peaks, valleys, supply of services, 
emissions, etc.), opportunity get rewards by responding 
positively to signal coming from the supplying utility. 
b. Technical objectives include the deployment of a stable, 
resilient, cyber-secure and reliable smart micro-grid 
capable of delivering high quality energy at the best 
prices to its users considering to their past, present and 
forecasted behavior. 
These objectives [26] translate themselves into 
specifications that highlight characteristics that are required 
or desirable: 
a. Control of the micro-grid available at different layers of 
a hierarchy. It permits to pursue the individual 
optimization objectives of single users within the 
general optimization scheme of the smart microgrid. 
b. Capability of “off the grid” operations when 
necessitated by external adverse electrical conditions. 
c. Face the stochastic nature of renewable PV and Wind 
generation. 
d. Increase reliability, availability and resiliency through 
coordinates operation of reconfiguration after an 
evaluation of possible alternatives and associated 
technical costs. 
e. Mitigate the consequences of energy fluctuations 
through dispatching energy storage, controlling of 
switchable loads, changing of import of energy, re-
dispatching of activities. 
f. Operate the smart micro-grid (i.e. its generation, 
storage, loads import/export) to ensure continuous 
quality delivery of energy Reduce or shift peak load 
exposed to the external utility on the basis of 
contractual conditions. 
g. Enable Vehicle to Grid (V2G) and Vehicle to Building 
(V2B) operations for port fleet of electrical vehicles. 
h. Enable organization and sound utilization of a Virtual 
Power Plant (VPP) based on the available generation 
sources. 
6. Design of Smart Micro-grid 
Successful deployment of a smart microgrid (or upgrading 
from an existing micro-grid) requires a proper design in rode 
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to achieve technical and economic results. Design of micro-
grid [16] starts from specifications that include size of initial 
load and generation, early economic investment, forecasted 
evolution and upgradability, mode of utilization of external 
energy supplies, expected operation schedules, stipulated 
contracts. Main points of specifications include: 
a. Energy Security – Ability to improve power supply to 
critical facilities. Routing of available energy to 
predetermined critical facilities is computer controlled. 
b. Energy Resiliency – Ability to provide power during 
utility grid outages and to recover more quickly if 
outages occur. “Resiliency” is the capability to operate 
through utility disturbances/disasters and or recover 
from them quickly. 
c. Power Quality – Ability to mitigate the impact of power 
quality fluctuations including harmonic content on the 
utility grid. 
d. Reduced Electric Load On The Utility – use of micro-
grid has an important role in reducing costs. For 
example, net-zero energy consumption could be 
achieved at the primary metering point due to optimized 
local energy production and consumption. 
e. Energy Savings – Savings are achieved through control 
of loads and energy consumption. For example, the 
energy normally wasted during a large crane’s braking 
operation could be captured and managed through 
regenerative breaking. 
f. Lower Electricity Costs – Enables best use of 
controllable loads and distributed generation resources, 
including renewables. 
Electrical design of electric micro-grid is carried out using 
network analysis packages such as loads and power flow, 
state estimation, stability and transient stability, voltage 
profiles, contingency analysis, etc. 
Design study is performed under various scenarios 
including the worst conditions, operations and 
synchronization capability in “on” and “off” the grid mode. 
Finally, risk analysis techniques like FMEA (Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis) and FMECA (Failure Mode and Effect 
and Criticalities Analysis) are used either to complete the 
preliminary project or to permit an objective evaluation of 
the design. In this stage an exhaustive fault tree is 
established, it will be helpful to analyze alarms (root and 
trees) in phase of detection of a cyber-attack. 
The smart micro-grid is generally designed to support a 
“plug in type” approach to allow an easy horizontal and 
vertical upgrade as well as a seamless addition and 
integration of new equipment or replacement of existing one 
with a minimum of reconfiguration of existing configuration 
and with the reduction of the risk of temporarily 
downgrading of the service. 
On another side there are design criteria deriving from the 
need for high grid resilience to maintain active critical 
services during extended utility outages, maximize the 
potential utilization of renewables and reducing emissions. 
Critical (that is “must serve”), no-critical loads and 
generating and storage farms are assigned to different 
feeders. Critical feeders are often powered by dedicated 
generators and backed by their own energy storage so that 
their required level of operability is always ensured. 
For design purposes operators are categorized as active 
controllable or uncontrollable being the difference 
represented by the level of dispatchability, capability and 
flexibility of their equipment to respond to exogenous 
requests to adjust load and/or generation profile and finally 
level of local intelligence. 
Design adheres to a general organization of control that 
follows a hierarchical and decentralized scheme i.e.: 
a. Any effort is done to allow each port operator to operate 
according to its own objective, preferences, schedule 
and policy. Available local controls are referred as 
action space of the controller. 
b. Policy and objectives of the whole micro-grid are 
established at the highest level of the control hierarchy. 
c. Coordination principles take into account the 
interaction among controllers (i.e. the fact they operate 
on their own horizon according to a specific policy 
without knowing operations of other controllers at the 
same level). 
Finally from a cyber point of view the design of smart 
micro grid must depend also on communication and 
information infrastructures. Integration enhances capabilities 
and is useful of the most of grid operations, but on the other 
hand increases vulnerabilities. Therefore domain specific 
approaches and solutions are necessary [27]. It is important 
[11] to understand the complex relations between cyber and 
grid domains, and the possible impacts of cyber events on the 
smart micro grid. 
7. Organization of Control 
Two possible control modes are considered. 
7.1. Centralized Control 
Centralized control architecture implies that all tertiary 
control functions (forecasting, economic optimization, etc.) 
are located on a computer server at one site, preferably 
within the microgrid. 
Remote monitoring and control from an off-site location 
can also be accommodated in this control scheme. 
7.2. Distributed Control 
A distributed control approach has no central controller. 
Instead, there are multiple distributed controllers located 
within the microgrid. 
Each distributed controller operates locally and 
communicates with one another through a peer-to-peer 
communication and with the master hierarchically. 
A port has a pyramidal structure centered on a authority 
and many underlying organizations and operators. For these 
reasons an adequate criteria is the selection of a decentralized 
hierarchical mode of control and structure. 
Two types of controller are generally employed: 
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a. Master controller at the highest level of the hierarchy 
(let we say the port authority). 
b. Local controllers at organization and user level. Each of 
them interacts directly with people and the local 
equipment. 
 
Figure 1. General control organization. 
From a logical point of view it is used a set of agents 
(decision-makers, controllers, actors) and for each agent a 
preference ordering (utility function, performance criterion, 
pay-off function, reward function, etc.). 
It is defined a set of permissible decisions (action space Ai 
and a probability φ on state space for the decision set) for 
each agent and a command information structure for the 
entire structure. 
Each agent makes observation of the environment (state-of 
the world from its point of view) in which the agent is 
operating, and then performs a mapping from the state into 
the underlying structure, 
Each agent has a description or model of the smart 
microgrid i.e., the way in which the known state and the 
combined actions of the agent will affect the operations. 
Local controllers do not act passively on sole the basis of 
their data and policy instructions, but operate also on the 
basis of specific policy generated by the master controller 
constrained by coordination principles and within their action 
space Ai. 
The master controller devises an optimal policy based on 
the knowledge of the general state and identifies the targets 
of each local controllers. 
Any local controller looks to achieve its objectives in the 
best way but may be in conflict with the operations of other 
controllers and the general optimum computed by the master 
controller. In such a case an economic technique based on 
fees and rewards is used to work out the rising conflicting 
situation. 
8. Strategies to Counteract Deviations 
from Expected Profiles 
The master controller decides on the actions to take when 
significant events happen in the smart microgrid domain. The 
events that may require actions to bring the deviating user 
back to its reference are: 
a. A significant deviation in the pattern of 
consumption/generation. 
b. Deviations that may happen due to changes of the 
scheduled operations conditions respect to previously 
entered or forecasted. 
c. The reception of request from external stakeholders 
(Utilities, retailers). 
The decision on a policy change required to remediate the 
situations is decided by the master controller, it might decide 
on making a new plan by requesting the activation of a new 
short term planning or requesting the modification of 
operations of users. 
Once the calculation of the new policy and associated plan 
is finished the low level controllers will be informed about 
the new consumption patterns to follow. 
9. Forecasting of Consumption and of 
Generation 
The importance of integrating a forecasting mechanism for 
energy consumption and generation depends on the 
possibility of devising proper strategies to operate efficiently 
in the energy market. The idea is to establish the basic energy 
behavior of users so that information on their attitude, 
flexibility, response to prices and other parameters can be 
instrumental to forecast their future behavior in order to 
make bids on dispatching services, capacity markets, reserve 
markets and to stipulate better economic conditions with the 
electrical utility at the time of negotiation of the contract. 
This forecasting mechanism relies on the knowledge of the 
past behavior of users, data about energy utilizations vs 
schedule of activities. 
The basis of forecasting is a set of predictors used for the 
identification procedure; they are employed to elaborate the 
historical behavior of users as a function of the main variable 
of interest (i.e., the inputs of the identified model). 
These variables of interest describe the scheduling of 
operations together with the "properties" of the day of the 
week (i.e., working day, holiday, day of week). 
By elaborating this information, it is possible to develop a 
model able to provide a good dynamical description of the 
expected energy consumption/generation behavior of the grid 
and it can be used to predict the amount of energy that will be 
generated and-or utilized in a specified time interval (e.g., 
next day, week, next 2 weeks). 
Since the identified model relies on past information it is 
possible to keep track and capture changes in the habits of 
the users. Clearly, several time-horizons (next week, next two 
weeks) can be used depending on the particular need. It is 
obvious that a very long term prediction (next month) will be 
inaccurate because the principal pattern inputs are not 
available. Instead it would be possible to have a very long 
term prediction using only the past outputs (time series), but 
this policy is usable only if the signals trends are regular. 
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10. Photovoltaic Energy Generation 
Port generation is a mix of many assets like micro CHP 
(Combined heat plant), diesel gen set, gas turbines, off shore 
wind generation farms, but the really green generation is 
based on photovoltaic generation and in some case of wind 
farms (where possible and allowed). The photovoltaic 
generation depends on the day of the year, on geographical 
position and on the cloudy factor, a parameter that indicates 
the cloudy intensity in a determinate place in a determinate 
time. 
Using the historical generation data, the historical day’s 
number data, the historical month data and the historical 
cloudy factor data is possible to generate an identification 
and prediction model (ARX model) for the electrical energy 
generation. 
The inputs of this model is the information about the 
months for next period, the numbers of the day for the next 
period (from 1 to 365) and the cloudy factors for the next 
period. The output is the predicted electrical energy 
generation. 
Equally important is storage capability for its fast reacting 
capability to support the microgrid. 
11. Micro-grid Resilience 
Resilience is the ability to maintain acceptable electrical 
service levels notwithstanding severe disruptions to 
equipment, critical control processes, communications and 
the IT systems. 
The distributed control of micro-grid aims to achieve 
resilience in terms of: 
a. Minimization of the occurrence of outages. 
b. Mitigation of any incidents. 
c. Minimization of the impact of outages. 
d. Reconfiguration. 
e. Quick restoration of the normal working conditions of 
the grid. 
12. Cyber-security Aspects of Smart 
Grids 
Cyber information security plays a fundamental role in 
operation of smart micro-grids due to their strategic nature; 
smart micro grids represent the basis for the activities of the 
most port infrastructures. Cybersecurity is a major concern in 
the operations of a micro smart grid. 
Because of this strategic role and the massive presence of 
intelligent components, cyber-security policy for smart micro 
grid (which includes attack prevention, detection, target 
deception, mitigation and resilience) represents a big 
challenge. To study effect of attacks, weakness and possible 
countermeasures it is useful to define models that are 
important to quantify potential consequences of a cyber-
attack in terms of dangerous orders, misconfigurations, 
stability violations, and damage to equipment and economic 
losses. 
According to a joint study by Iowa State University and 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, after 
completion of an appropriate risk assessment, a key design 
step is the development of an integrated set of security 
algorithms to protect the network from multiple forms of 
cyber-attacks, such as denial of service attacks, malware-
based attacks, etc. 
Such algorithms take into consideration very sophisticated 
attacking modeled that potentially might cause a maximum 
level of damage. Algorithms to mitigate the risk of an ICT 
attack needs to be developed through real-time correlation of 
the data streams obtained from substations and control 
centers, these algorithms are designed to prevent, detect and 
mitigate cyber-attacks. 
Mechanisms that correlate multiple, advanced detection 
techniques are useful to manage cyber threats and process 
risks. 
Within available and developing techniques the ones 
identified as "Run-time security monitoring" [28] are a good 
starting point, they include: 
a. Definition and support of metrics to measure the 
distance deviation of the current state / behavior of the 
grid from those defined by the security policy. 
b. Verification of compliance with behavior-based security 
policies (dynamic evolution) and not only on the state 
of the grid. 
c. Extension to probabilistic / stochastic models to support 
run-time risk assessment, manage countermeasures 
according to appropriate priorities and reduce the risk 
of late responses. The goal is to identify optimal 
protection in a set of predefined scenarios, without 
making any assumptions about the current situation or 
the attack strategy. 
d. Assessment of the worst case scenario to be faced. 
Finally it is worth to note that protocols used in the SCADA, 
such as the inter-Control Center Communications Protocol 
ICCP also known as International Electro-technical 
Commission (IEC)/60870-6/Telecontrol Application Service 
Element 2 (TASE.2), IEC 61850, Distributed Network 
Protocol (DNP3) (derived by GE-Harris from IEC 60870-5), if 
not properly protected, may be used as carriers to launch 
cyber-attacks. Secure versions of these protocols and 
continuous surveillance of information networks are required. 
12.1. Cyber - Attacks to Smart Grids 
The infrastructure of the electricity sector generate a high 
dependence of almost all the other critical infrastructures and 
of vital functions, it is evident the dangerous impact that a 
cyber-attack might have by forcing these infrastructures to be 
non-operational or even not available. 
Escalation of cyber-attacks against industrial control 
systems has been reported. These attacks are targeted toward 
systems and apparatuses responsible for monitoring and 
controlling critical infrastructures (for example equipment for 
the production and distribution of electricity) [29]. These 
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systems are characterized by peculiar aspects (geographical 
distribution, unmanned sub-systems, strong interaction 
between logical level and physical level, strong requirements 
on service continuity) that make traditional defense 
techniques weaker or ineffective. 
The sensitivity towards potential cyber-attacks on the 
infrastructures, in addition to increasing in proportion to the 
growth of the complexity of these systems, is amplified, as 
already noted, by increasing interconnection, growing use of 
COTS and increasing use of new technological paradigms in 
the ICT sector (virtualized systems). 
It is a fact that any new technological development 
introduces secu interconnection rity vulnerabilities and 
criticalities and needs accurate compatibility checks with the 
requisites typical of the management of critical 
infrastructures such as: high performance, ease of, 
redundancies, responses in the time required by process 
dynamics and high level of reliability (continuity of the 
electricity service). 
The security context finds a further dimension of 
interpretation in the analysis of the level of danger of 
potential attackers and of the related motivations, objectives 
and technical capabilities. The need to prevent events 
deriving from well-organized attackers, often with strong 
financial capabilities, technical skills and the availability of 
state of the art technological tools is widely shared. These 
attackers often have the possibility of using "zero-day" 
vulnerabilities, bypassing the detection systems of attacks 
based on "signature" and most of the current Prevention 
solutions / Detection of attacks. 
The perception of risk of the concerned parties and 
stakeholders of critical infrastructures has grown to such an 
extent that is widely recognized that the adoption of 
industrial control solutions cannot be separated from an 
assessment of defense capabilities against cyber-attacks [1]. 
In this context, characterized by the combination of 
relevant factors, such as the logical-physical nature of the 
infrastructure, the need to guarantee a high level of service 
continuity and the threat of technically competent and well-
organized attackers the prevention needs to be addressed by 
multiple concurring techniques. Among them: 
a. The collection of feedback regarding the security level 
of the physical infrastructure. 
b. The correlation of information coming from the domain 
of ICT security, physical security and process logic. 
c. The security of technologies installed in unmanned 
environments due to peculiar distribution of the 
infrastructures. 
d. Very short reaction times required for reaction and 
implementation of countermeasures. 
Game theory is becoming a promising solution for cyber 
security context. Attacks and countermeasures can be 
evaluated by assessing the strategies and payoffs for each side. 
12.2. Vulnerability of Control Systems 
As known basic building blocks of a micro-grid are: 
a. Generation and storage, 
b. Distribution, 
c. Delivery and exchange of energy. 
Each block includes sub-systems whose task is the control 
of specific machines/devices and operate using dedicated 
communication signals and protocols. Each control sub-
system is subjected to specific vulnerabilities; they could 
constitute vectors of threats with a consequent potential 
impact on the operations of the whole supply system. Figure 
2 shows a conceptual figure of a cyber-physical system. 
 
Figure 2. Grid structure, Simmhan et al. (2013). 
12.3. Game Theory Support 
Game theory provides a mathematical model of the 
interactions between players and has gained increased 
prevalence due to its logical applicability to a vast range of 
topics as well as gaining additional traction in cyber security 
research [30, 31]. 
As pointed out in the already quoted paper [22], game 
theory provides an interesting potential solution for cyber 
security issues and allows evaluating effects of the actions 
between attackers and defenders in cyberspace by assessing 
the strategies and payoffs for each side. Often it is assumed 
that there exist perfect information and the attacker and the 
defender have complete knowledge of the strategies and 
capabilities of the opposing player. 
It is an approach that contributes to a simplification of the 
problem and allows for a more tractable solution, but it may 
be not realistic in application to real-world scenarios. In fact 
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while each side may know their respective capabilities, 
intent, and strategies, there is a degree of uncertainty about 
the attacker. Even if less mathematically tractable an 
approach based on imperfect game is more realistic. 
12.4. Examples of Attacks 
An attacker could design malicious activities based on the 
contemporary perturbation of both the control and physical 
systems, but it could also cause a coordinated series of 
commands and data that might cause an unexpected behavior 
of the infrastructure. 
As another example [22] an attack may modify data 
collected from the grid or other devices and subsystems (an 
attack known as “false data injection”). This type of attack is 
difficult to identify, it is a situation where “bad data 
detection” algorithms may fail even in presence of redundant 
and correlated measurements and known probability 
distribution of measurement errors. 
This situation greatly complicates the systems security 
monitoring and the applicability of the technologies that are 
currently available in this field, with the consequence of 
making more difficult to achieve an overall vision of the 
evolution of the security of the micro-grid and an 
understanding complete with all the events that are acquired. 
13. Cybersecurity on Smart and  
Micro-grid 
As observed in many ongoing projects, recommendations 
and standards, in particular in the United States by NIST 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) and within 
the EU by ENISA (European Network and Information 
Security Agency) Cyber-security plays a very important role. 
Unfortunately there is currently no common approach and 
technology for applications in SCADA and EMS and this is 
even truer for the Smart Grids. 
Therefore instead of investigating and proposing new 
technologies, we try to clarify the process of defining the 
appropriate and measurable requirements of cyber-security to 
define realistic, efficient and scalable solutions. 
Today computer security is an essential block for the 
reliability of any control system and is to be considered from 
the beginning of any project and not as an additional final 
component, as it may happens. Having in mind cybersecurity 
it is reasonable to start analysing from the beginning the 
specific needs of microgrid and users / stakeholders and the 
interconnections of data exchange. 
Cyber events [11] both intentional acts of sabotage and 
random hardware or software failures impact the proper 
operation of the wide-area closed-loop decision engine. 
These events are broadly categorized into four categories as 
follows: 
a. Events that affect physical equipment; 
b. Events that affect communication channels; 
c. Events that affect applications; 
d. Events that affect data. 
Analysis of network traffic at connection points relevant to 
the distributed control system is a critical factor. 
Protocols are exposed to attacks: 
a. Lack of authentication. 
b. Lack of encryption. 
c. Backdoors. 
d. Buffer overflow. 
e. Tailored attacks for control physical components. 
Current configurations range from easily configurable 
systems, which require traffic rules explicit to sophisticated 
self-learning machines that build data communication profile 
for each node of the control network profile can separate 
autonomously normal and abnormal traffic, after a period of 
unsupervised or supervised training. 
A promising technology, i.e. "Defence in depth" is at the 
initial stage and it's more expensive than filtering traffic, but 
it increases security of the single control nodes, 
independently of interconnection topology. 
Defence in depth is an approach to cybersecurity where a 
set of defensive mechanisms are layered on over the other in 
order to protect valuable data and information that are used 
by control applications. If one mechanism fails, another is 
immediately triggered to prevent an attack. 
This approach may to become very valid, but in general it 
is justifiable only for new installations, while in other cases a 
mix between in-depth and more traditional filtering must be 
evaluated. 
A good compromise for the choice has been proposed in 
the standard ANSI/ISA-99, based on security zones and 
connection gateways. The term "Zone" means a grouping of 
logical or physical assets that share common safety 
requirements, based on factors such as criticality or others. 
The gateway connects different zones, is able to resist Denial 
of Service (DoS) or the injection of malware via back doors 
and protects the integrity and privacy of traffic on the 
network. The techniques of encapsulating areas guarantee the 
protection of much more areas from public networks; the 
deeper the encapsulation of an area is, the greater is its 
security. 
A sophisticated attacker can attempt to modify the 
behavior of a SCADA and PMU (phasor measurements 
units) and in particular to directly or indirectly influence the 
data (states, measures, alarms) and the commands 
(continuous and discrete) in such a way to mislead the 
supervision and control system, protection, dispatching and 
operators. This type of attack may trigger improper 
interventions that may be harmful to the integrity of the 
equipment and interfere with the continuity of the service. 
An important type of attacks on the grid is represented by 
the "Intrusions": this type of attack refers to exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of software and communication along the 
network infrastructures that provide access to critical 
elements of the micro-grid and related control /data 
acquisition [33]. 
"Malware" instead consists of malicious software that aims 
to exploit the existing vulnerabilities in the software system, 
RTUs, programmable logical controllers, or protocols. Once 
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the malware has gained access, it tries to cause damage in the 
system using self-propagation mechanism. 
The "Denial of service” attacks aim to make services or 
resources unavailable for an indefinite period of time, 
denying the possibility to legitimate users of access them. 
This type of attack can aim to submerge the communication 
network (or a single server) with high volumes of traffic or 
loads of work to inhibit the legitimate operation. 
"Insider threats" are considered a serious danger, due to the 
privileged position that the potential attacker to operate from 
within the organization. 
Finally, "Routing attacks", occur on internet routing 
infrastructures. Although this type of attack is not directly 
related to grid operations, it may have consequences on 
operations of software power applications. 
13.1. Risk Assessment 
A cyber security risk assessment consists of understanding, 
managing, controlling and mitigating cyber risk across an 
organization. It is a crucial part of any organization's risk 
management strategy and data protection efforts. (NIST) 
Indeed as a consequence of the diffusion of new technologies 
for the electricity distribution network, it is necessary to face 
new threats, vulnerabilities and security requirements; as 
consequence it emerges the need to carry out dedicated to 
risk analysis specific to the domain of intervention. Three 
questions are to be answered: 
a. What is the threat? 
b. How vulnerable is the system? 
c. What is the reputational or financial damage if breached 
or made unavailable? 
In the presentation of Tieghi [32] it is well explained that 
“assessing the consequences of industrial cyber-attack is not 
simply a case of assigning a financial value to an incident. 
Although there are obvious direct impacts which may be 
easily quantifiable financially other consequences may be 
less obvious. For most companies the impact on reputation is 
probably far more significant than merely the cost of a 
operation outage”. 
First intervention should be based on the study and 
application of risk assessment methodologies in the specific 
intervention scenario, being this activity as a necessary step 
for the definition of secure methods for infrastructure 
protection. An appropriate risk assessment methodology is 
essential to identify threats accurately and in all its aspects 
and to assess vulnerabilities even belonging to non-
homogeneous technological categories. 
13.2. List of Common Attacks 
A basic list follows: 
a. Spear-phishing emails (from compromised legitimate 
accounts), 
b. Watering-hole domains, 
c. ICS infrastructure targeting and credential gathering, 
d. Host-based exploitation, 
e. Industrial control, 
f. Open-source reconnaissance, 
g. Denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks, 
h. Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack, 
i. Phishing and spear phishing attacks, 
j. Drive-by attack, 
k. Password attack, 
l. SQL injection attack, 
m. Cross-site scripting (XSS) attack, 
n. Eavesdropping attack. 
Assessment of the impact on the level of service is 
performed using risk management analysis taking into 
account the presence of peculiarities dependent on the use of 
the different technologies and the probability of the 
occurrence of these events. 
13.3. Disruption Attacks 
Attacks whose purpose is the overpressure of a service for 
a certain period of time, creating an unavailability of the 
same usefulness for the purposes of decision-making 
processes: 
a. DDoS-attacks from outside targeting inside assets 
(Inbound attacks). 
b. DDoS-attacks from inside targeting inside assets 
(Internal attacks). 
c. DDoS-attacks from inside attacking targets outside 
(Outbound attacks). 
d. DDoS-attacks on certain user groups (selective 
harassment). 
13.4. Destruction Attacks 
Unlike the disruption attacks that permit the service can be 
restored after the attack, in the case of destruction it is 
generally necessary to rebuilt the infrastructure: This type of 
attack is able to: 
a. Disconnect households. 
b. Destroy energy management system. 
c. Influence critical electrical nodes in the grid. 
d. Modify sensor data. 
e. Tamper with clock synchro. 
13.5. Theft of Information 
Stealing a commodity such as information to reveal to 
competitors: 
a. Espionage: 
b. Ruin credibility of users: 
c. Sell long term data: 
d. Bill manipulation. 
13.6. Extortion Schemes 
This type of malware restricts access to the device it 
infects, requiring a ransom. It may include: 
a. Commodity or service. 
b. Threat of destruction. 
c. Threat of DDoS. 
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d. Crypto-locker. 
13.7. Repurpose Attacks 
They include the capability to reuse a vulnerability stolen 
or known in some way. Or alternatively used leaked 
offensive tools originally developed by other organizations: 
a. Fake servers. 
b. Proxies. 
c. Distributed computing. 
REMARK: A potential very specific growing risk is the 
possibility that the supervision and control system (SCADA) 
of the micro-grid is deceived by false data coming from 
compromised peripheral units (RTUs, PLCs, Smart Inverters 
and other smart equipment) or through interconnections with 
other systems that are the object of successful attack. It is 
essential to install tools able to distinguish between 
"genuine" data, incorrect data, whose error depends on 
malfunctioning of the peripheral instrumentation or the RTU 
"and data whose origin is dubious (potentially affected by 
malicious attacks). 
13.8. Consequence of Communications Failure 
It has been noted in Guo et al. [34] that problems on 
transmission line monitoring function may not cause direct 
changes on the physical system topology. But if 
communications is subject to transmission line monitoring 
function suffers from random failures due for example to 
cyber part of the physical system is unobservable to the 
operators / applications and therefore no remedial action can 
be taken. 
14. Countermeasures 
Consistently with the priority requirement of 
continuity service typical of electrical grid and the need 
to safeguard the integrity of the equipment, a strong 
focus is required on the adoption of technological 
solutions aimed at prevention of intentional attacks and 
characterized by a low degree of invasiveness on 
equipment and the systems (Like SCADA, EMS, DMS, 
smart protection system, etc.). 
In response to these threats it is convenient to implement 
protection techniques in IT platforms and perform analysis of 
the data acquired by the various subsystems or transferred by 
other organizations in order to distinguish between “genuine, 
inclusive of real incorrect data, but whose error depends on 
malfunctioning of peripheral equipment or RTU” and data 
whose origin is doubtful (potentially invalidated by malicious 
attacks). 
The integration of different technological approaches, 
namely IT protection, recognition of intrusions, etc. and 
analysis of data / commands leads to a higher level of 
security of supervision and control systems. It is advisable to 
focus on methods for continuous monitoring of the security 
status of the infrastructure, through the acquisition, analysis 
and correlation of relevant data. 
The most important intervention areas deal with the use of 
attack identification techniques based on the continuous 
analysis of security events, integrity of messages, states, 
alarms, measurements and commands coming / sent to the 
remote control systems (SCADA), from the metering 
systems, from ICT systems, various users, from any external 
communication networks that connect to other systems 
(Electrical Utility, ships, service centers, port organizations, 
shipping companies, etc.) and from the protection systems of 
physical "assets". 
A coordinate use of these techniques allows to evaluate the 
overall behavior of the grid, highlighting: 
a. The presence of attacks (discriminating from really 
wrong information). 
b. Changes in the level of risk that must be faced. 
14.1. Modeling and Configuring 
Activities need to be carried out for the identification of 
models appropriate to detect attacks and activating 
countermeasures, especially considering the heterogeneous 
nature of grid infrastructure. 
The widespread diffusion of solutions for the 
centralization and correlation of information security events 
is instrumental to extend the capacity of current products 
including physical security solutions, and the search for event 
correlation capabilities across the different technological and 
organizational levels of the micro- grid. 
These attempts that are now limited by the capabilities of 
the current implementations generally characterized by a 
limited scalability, only basic correlation functionalities (e.g. 
the normalization of the events and the related aggregation 
by categories) and a weak support of automatic analysis of 
events. Furthermore, these technologies generally have a low 
level of integration at process level. 
In this area of work is necessary to define a technical 
reference architecture, which leveraging Open Source 
modules or COTS products, will help to develop the 
necessary functionalities to build a complete awareness of the 
changing dynamics of grid safety. 
It is useful to strengthen the current state of the art in 
security monitoring systems, focusing particularly on the 
definition of methods to identify the dependencies of the 
grid's operational process towards all the technologies served 
to it. In particular, ad hoc functionalities are to be developed 
for: 
a. Acquisition, normalization and correlation of security 
events coming from remote control systems, from ICT 
systems, from physical security systems. 
b. Determination of the stability of the operational 
processes by evaluating the data acquired by the remote 
control systems. 
c. Continuous monitoring of all the parameters describing 
security status of logical, physical structures and the 
level of regularity and stability of the operational 
process, in order to correlate them for more advanced 
and reliable cognition capability. 
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14.2. Monitoring of the State of the Grid 
It is possible to use different methods for monitoring the 
state of the grid. They are based mainly on the comparison 
between different data sources using a dynamic model of the 
system and in the analysis of grid data patterns together with 
their classification. This comparison and analysis is used to 
identify data that differ from their expected value given: 
a. The current network status, 
b. The historical series of data, 
c. The expected evolution of the micro-grid (generally 
derived from the past history and current data plus work 
schedule). 
Analytical tools such as Vector Support Machines (SVM), 
Outlier analysis (OA), Principal component analysis (PCA), 
Precursor analysis (PA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and the 
like are of great help, especially if used in mutual support. 
The probable conditions in the next period of observation, 
helps to avoid that an attacker can compromise vital 
information. 
Indeed equipment malfunctions, errors due to improper or 
incorrect configurations are inevitable during the operation of 
the electrical grid and unfortunately these are situations that 
can easily mask the initial phases of an attack. Therefore it is 
mandatory to identify them through analysis based on rules 
and peculiar characteristics of the entire electrical system. 
The verification of data in search of anomalies inconsistent 
with the expected state of the system requires the analysis of 
network behaviors, incorporating information from a wide 
variety of sensors of different types, of the grid protections 
and information coming from the PMUs, PLCs and RTUs. 
An attack can occur simultaneously in separate sections of 
the micro grid so that it is necessary to use specific analysis 
methods to evaluate the data coming from these areas with a 
single model. The detection of cascading effects and their 
precise temporal sequence in coherence with the collected 
data is used for the recognition of a true attack from an 
authentic malfunction and alarm. 
Three phases are sequenced: 
a. Statistical analysis and classification of data (which will 
be subsequently used by the control and supervision 
system) with the aim of preliminarily identifying the 
data that does not belong to the set of expected data. 
This phase should make it possible to identify 
suspicious data, eliminate them and activate the 
appropriate countermeasures. During this phase the 
alarms and events are examined through the execution 
of an active fault tree to verify that these events and 
alarms are correctly set based on the preventive FMEA 
analysis. 
b. Verification of the coherence of data during the 
processing phase through analytical and heuristic 
models. 
c. Replacement of "suspicious" data with internally 
generated pseudo-data. These data allow the normal 
course of operations and are associated with a flag that 
identify them as replaced data. 
14.3. Identify Attacks 
A defense system must identify complex attacks, using 
analysis of events (or example via fault tree, simulation, 
normal grid status, etc.) and predicted status using historical 
series and the current status. 
Apart from traditional methods, physical assessment of the 
status of micro-grid is employed making confrontation 
between normal status (based on current situation) and status 
deriving from validated data that characterizes the "normal 
state”. 
This process includes: 
a. Real-time analysis of information and state estimation 
including methods to understand deviation from normal 
state (due to real malfunctions or compromised data). 
b. Identification of techniques to be used for the 
identification of attacks. 
c. Surveillance of communications to locate attacks 
d. Recognition of anomalies inside the “big” data 
characterizing the grid (outlier detection, SVM, 
anomaly detection, etc.). 
14.4. State Estimation 
It has been suggested [22] to work out the problem of 
failing of bad data detection tests by employing a hierarchical 
distributed state estimation not only on the grid but also for 
associated communication infrastructure and subsystem. This 
“augmented” estimation makes use of as many redundant 
measurements as possible. The “augmented” state solution 
makes easier and more reliable the identification of 
suspicious data before they are actually used by an attacker. 
The information from the hierarchical state estimation 
includes therefore the results of state estimation of 
subsystems (often the micro-grid customers) in order to 
verify that there is a substantial coincidence. If there is no 
coincidence an alarm is raised and the suspicious piece of 
data or item is excluded from subsequent computation steps. 
If the control center is under attack, local state estimations 
can be used for control and supervision purposes. 
Measurements on one section of the micro-is employed to 
verify the consistency of data coming from another section. 
14.5. Analysis of Alarms and Events with Fault Tree 
Sequences of alarms and events can be altered by 
malicious interventions and lead to untimely interventions if 
not even harmful to the equipment and to impair the 
continuity and quality of the service. 
Therefore it is crucial to verify the validity of these 
sequences through appropriate methodologies. A promising 
development line is to verify whether an alarm defined as 
"significant" (within the rules and a special dictionary 
associated to each grid) is confirmed by a set of events and 
alarms that should be generated according to correct 
sequences and over a certain time span. The Active Fault 
Tree approach is suitable to this purpose. It is necessary to 
verify from time to time that: 
 American Journal of Information Science and Technology 2020; 4(1): 1-16 13 
 
a. When a main alarm event is present, also related alarms 
/ events are existent in the correct time sequence. 
b. In the presence of secondary alarms (whose sequence 
and time window is verified) the main alarm actually 
exists. 
This tool operates using information collected and made 
available to the SCADA by field acquisition systems and 
subsequently integrated, allowing the detection of equipment 
malfunctions, the causes of failure and the components fault 
discriminating the real failures from those that are considered 
faulty due to non-genuine information. 
Analysis is time based and therefore the sequence of 
events that determine the start of an analysis must belong to a 
specific time interval. 
Specific tools are used to: 
a. the formal definition of events and alarms. 
b. the definition of the rules. 
c. execution of the fault tree based on the rules. 
d. presentation of the diagnosis. 
This methodology is based on the "Executable Fault Tree" 
(EFT) structure that is a fault tree composed of the following 
elements: 
a. "top event": final event produced by the analysis logic; 
b. “intermediate events and conditions”: intermediate 
events / conditions generated by the execution of the 
related correlation logic and the logical operators; 
c. "initiating events": events coming from the field and 
activating the correlation logic; 
d. "gates": transformation operators (in the graph). 
The Top Event of a Fault tree can be of two types: an event 
(typically an alarm) received from the field: 
a. an event produced by the execution of the Fault Tree 
that is generated by specific processing. 
In the first case the Fault Tree will deduce and verify the 
causes of the Top Event according to a TOP-DOWN 
approach: starting from the Top Event the conditions 
(Initiating Events) that should have triggered it will be 
verified. If the initiating events are not verified as correct or 
even existing it will be reasonable to assume that some 
information is not genuine. 
In the second case, the Fault Tree is used to generate the 
TOP EVENT according to a bottom up approach: given the 
conditions (Initiating Events) the actual presence of the TOP 
Event is identified. If the processing does not lead to this 
event, again it could be in the presence of non-genuine data. 
Through EFT it is possible to study how to formally model 
different scenarios / logics in a scalable manner depending on 
the characteristics of each grid. In particular, it is possible to 
model: 
a. Combinatory Logics; 
b. Relative Sequential Logics: i.e. the relative order of 
(expected) occurrence of events; 
c. Absolute Sequential Logics: that is, items placed on a 
quantified time scale; 
d. Mixed Logics: i.e. combination of the previous logics. 
A Fault Tree (in particular an EFT that is "executable") is 
employed to model a behavior scenario identified by its Top 
Event, that is the root node of the fault tree and by the 
"Initiating Events", i.e. from the leaf nodes of the tree. 
15. Statistical Analysis 
15.1. Outlier 
The validation / discrimination of data between genuine 
and non-genuine can be conducted through an analysis that 
identifies the presence of anomalous information (Outlier). 
The identification of outliers represents a crucial phase of the 
data verification process, as it can be considered that they 
represent an effective indication of anomalies or anomalous 
tendency on which to carry out further analyzes. Naturally it 
cannot be excluded that they represent a valid indication (due 
to the intrinsic variability of the investigated phenomenon; 
also in this case the identification of the outlier is important, 
at least from the electrical point of view). 
Outliers can be univariate, that is, they have an extreme 
value for a single variable, or multivariate, so they present an 
anomalous combination of values on a certain number of 
variables. This means that a multivariate outlier will not 
necessarily present at least one extreme value on one of the 
variables, so all its scores could be perfectly admissible but 
they could represent an unlikely response pattern with respect 
to the rest of the subjects. 
Multivariate outliers are specifically activated for: 
a. Verify the conceptual validity of the use of the outliers 
for data validation and verification of their authenticity. 
b. Identify the class of data with the best features in 
relation to their validation. 
c. Select and possibly design methods for identifying 
multivariate outliers. 
15.2. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
The Principal Component analysis is often used as a data 
analysis tool and for the realization of predictive models. The 
PCA analysis is able to reveal the internal structure of the 
data in relation to their variance and allows obtaining a 
reduction in the complexity of the number of factors that 
explain a phenomenon. 
The theoretical point of view the Principal component 
analysis (PCA) is a statistical procedure that uses an 
orthogonal transformation to convert a series of observations 
of potentially correlated variables into a set of values of 
linearly uncorrelated variables known as Principal 
Components where the number of main components is less 
than or equal to the number of original variables. This 
transformation is defined in such a way that the first main 
component has the largest possible variance (it is therefore 
characterized by the maximum possible variance), and each 
successive component has in turn the maximum possible 
variance under the constraint that is orthogonal to the 
previous components. The resulting vectors constitute an 
orthogonal set. The main components are orthogonal because 
they are the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix, which is 
symmetric. 
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Through the PCA it is possible to determine a certain 
number of "latent" variables (factors not directly measurable) 
that are more reduced and summarized with respect to the 
number of starting variables. 
It is necessary to perform the validation of measurements 
and the possible identification of falsified data and therefore 
the search for a significant minimum set of latent variables 
weighted on the basis of their importance and characteristics 
of the system in question. In particular it is important to study 
the variance and its variation from the normally expected 
values. These variations take place in the case of 
modifications of a certain number of continuous variables 
and are traced to the latent variables whose number is lower 
and whose behavior can be analyzed more easily. 
The criteria of discrimination is object of investigations 
linked to the way in which the falsified variables are reflected 
on the latent variables between variation of the variance due 
to real modifications of the measured data, compared to that 
obtained when some of these facts are modified by an 
intervention malevolent. 
15.3. Anomaly Detection 
The recognition of faults or anomalies is a fundamental 
activity in many situations, often linked to the problem of 
maintaining security within a grid. The concept of "anomaly" 
of for system derives from the definition of "normal" 
condition which represents the condition that the control seek 
to maintain in every area. 
15.4. Support Vector Machine Prediction 
The trend of variables and even better of a set of variables 
in a "normal grid" status can be predicted on the basis of the 
associated historical series, the better the greater the depth of 
the time series. The set or a subset of the variables can be 
classified as belonging to a normal or non-normal 
configuration. The methodology of Support Vector Machines 
(statistical supervised learning) is one of the methods that can 
be used effectively for classification and also for regressive 
analysis. Support vector machines (SVM) or kernel machines 
are a set of supervised learning methods for regression and 
pattern classification. 
They belong to the family of generalized linear classifiers 
and are also known as maximum margin classifiers, since at 
the same time they minimize the empirical classification 
error and maximize the geometric margin. Support vector 
machines can be thought of as an alternative technique for 
learning classifiers, as opposed to classical neural network 
training techniques. 
The SVM training technique solves both problems: it 
presents an efficient algorithm and is able to represent 
complex non-linear functions. The characteristic parameters 
of the network are obtained by solving a convex quadratic 
programming problem with equality or box constraints (in 
which the parameter value must be kept within an interval), 
which provides a single global minimum. 
They are classification methods that guarantee a high 
accuracy of the prediction and do not require a large amount 
of data and are generally not affected by "overfitting". 
The quality of the prediction (based on historical series 
containing both the trends of the manipulated variables and 
those that can be manipulated) makes it possible to evaluate 
the status of a variable following the previous measurements 
and the current acquisition cycle; if there was a significant 
deviation (that should be confirmed by the Anomaly 
detection analysis) an analysis will be performed to 
understand the reason for the deviation. Note that the cause 
and effect relationship is already implicit in time series and 
therefore it is not necessary to implement an analytical 
model. 
16. Basic Solution Approach 
The cyber-security solution for protection are divided into 
a. Functional improvements of process, 
b. Customized off-the-shelf solution, integrated into nodes 
(such as firewalls, hardening mechanism, strong 
authentication) and communication channels (such as 
VPN and encryption). 
An event correlator based solution. It uses an active fault 
tree analysis supported by symptom detection technique 
tools. It analyses incidents, identifies abnormal ones and 
searches for hidden patterns among them. The event 
correlator is often associated with a security console that may 
be seen as a "mini security operation centre", such as 
decision support for the management of physical and logical 
security of the whole system. 
Non-functional approaches are: 
a. Exploitation of the priority of the security requirements 
of logical components of Smart Grids, it is based on a 
specific analysis of risk weighted by appropriate critical 
parameters in order to identify reasonable, effective and 
timely countermeasures; 
b. A consequent logical partition of the smart or micro- 
grid in zones and communication channels that share 
security requirements homogeneous, allowing to 
customize cascade countermeasures. 
Furthermore Tools for continuous monitoring of the 
security status of the infrastructure, through the acquisition, 
analysis and correlation of relevant data are key factors for 
security. 
It is reasonable to use attack identification techniques 
based on the continuous analysis of safety events, states, 
alarms, measurements and commands coming / sent to the 
SCADA, from smart metering and from ICT security 
systems. An appropriate use of these techniques allows to 
evaluate the overall behavior of the infrastructure, 
highlighting: 
a. Presence of attacks (discriminating from really 
incorrect, but genuine, information). 
b. Changes in the level of risk. 
In summary it is useful to work on: 
a. the most suitable and reliable predictive methodologies 
in relation to grid reference. 
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b. the use of the prediction in the identification of 
anomalous cases that require further examinations. 
c. the construction of derived (information increased) 
variables that have a greater meaning (physical) with 
respect to the identification of a possible manipulation. 
17. Game Approach 
Conceptually the game strategy is based on a virtual 
hacker and a virtual operator. Accurate model of the micro-
grid is a prerequisite. The optimal strategy is identified by 
using game theory (Stakelberg competition and stochastic 
game for example). 
In the Stakelberg strategy hacker and the operator have a 
certain amount of resources while the grid is deemed to be in 
a known initial state. The attacker perform a number of 
attacks and he operator responds by activating a series of 
countermeasures. These operations cause an increase or loss 
of resources on both parties and the process goes on until one 
of the party has zero resources, that means the game is over. 
To be noted that during the competition the competing parties 
may choose different strategies to control transition of the 
micro-grid to a new state. Any migration implies an increase 
or loss of resources for both parties. 
The Stackelberg game is played where one player acts as 
the leader and the other the follower. The leader is a 
dominant position as it can enforce strategies on the follower, 
giving the leader a first-mover advantage. In this instance, the 
leader and follower are defined as they are previously listed 
in their respective level. The cost functions for each level are 
represented with respect to the leader, where the first level 
seeks to minimize the cost of a false alarm for the IDS and 
the second seeks to maximize the amount of disturbance 
caused by the attacker. 
A variation on the stochastic game, the Bayesian game, is 
used by Ouyang et al. [35] in order to evaluate a scenario in 
which there is asymmetric information amongst players and 
strategies are updated as the state of the system changes. 
Games with asymmetric information are those in which 
“agents have different information overtime. 
18. Conclusions 
Energy delivery in port infrastructures needs to be carried 
out in a safe and secure way, strongly protected, exploiting 
all the technological developments, providing favourable 
tariff, reducing cost and emissions, increasing revenues for 
port authority and internal operators. 
A sophisticated attacker can attempt to modify the 
behavior of control and monitoring systems and, in 
particular, directly or indirectly influence data (states, 
measurements, alarms) and commands (continuous and 
discrete) in such a way as to mislead the supervision and 
control system, protection and operators; what would trigger 
improper interventions, that in turns may be detrimental to 
the integrity of the equipment and interfere with the 
continuity of the service. 
It is appropriate to use techniques for the continuous 
monitoring of the safety of electrical infrastructures and to 
build identification of models to detect attacks. 
From a general point of view it is beneficial to focus on the 
definition of methods for dynamically identifying the 
dependencies of the operational process of the micro-grid 
towards all the technologies served to it. In particular it 
necessary to study: 
a. The acquisition, standardization and correlation of 
security events coming from SCADA systems, from 
ICT systems with these correlated, from physical 
security systems. 
b. Determination of the stability status of the micro-grid 
by evaluating the data acquired in real time by the 
SCADA systems. 
c. Check that the micro-grid is in the “normal state” and 
check alteration against measures that are deemed 
secure. 
d. The continuous monitoring of all the parameters 
describing the safety status of the logical, physical 
structures and the level of regularity and stability of the 
operational process, with a view to their correlation. 
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